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[勞思光] [許國宏] [呂健吉] [郭朝順] [黃冠閔] [伍至學] [龔維正] [陳振崑] [冀劍制] |
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黃冠閔之哲學教學網
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亞理士多德之形上學 Aristotle’s
Metaphysic 重點 §1. The
Subject Matter of Aristotle’s Metaphysics 形上學主題 - First philosophy, primary philosophy 第一哲學 ：研究最初原因、原理 ; 「通常都會假設所謂的智慧處理的就是事物的最初原因跟原理。」”All men suppose what is called wisdom (sophia) to deal with the first causes (aitia) and the principles (archai) of things” (981b28) ; 「既然我們要探討這種知識，我們必定要考慮什麼種的原因與原理，而其知識乃智慧。如果我們先考慮什麼是智慧的人，或許可以讓我們更明白。」“Since we are investigating this kind of knowledge, we must consider what these causes and principles are whose knowledge is Wisdom. Perhaps it will be clearer if we take the opinions which we hold about the wise man.” (982a4-7) 認識原因、根源的知識乃是智慧，; “the science is supreme, and superior to the subsidiary which knows for what end each action is to be done; i.e. the Good in each particular case, and in general the highest Good in the Whole of nature. (…) the term which we are investigating falls under the same science, which must speculate about first principles and causes; for the Good, i.e. the end is one of the causes.” (982b7) - The science of
Being as Being
研究存有作為存有的學問。 “
There is a science which studies Being qua Being, and the properties inherent in
it in virtue of its own nature. This science is not the same as any of the
so-called particular sciences, for none of the others contemplates Being
generally qua Being; they divide off some portion of it and study the attribute
of this portion, as do for example the mathematical sciences.”(G 1,1003a21)
“Hence if these principles were investigated by those also who investigated
the elements of existing things, the elements must be elements of Being not
accidentally, but qua Being. Therefore it s of Being qua Being that we too must
grasp the first causes.” (G 1,
1003a29-32) cf. K 3, 1060b31-32 ; science which deals universally with Being qua
Being, and not with particular Being ; inquiry into the causes of Being qua
Being, (G
1, 1003a26-31; E 1,
1025b3-4; K 1, 1059a18-20) it deals with Being qua Being, which now seems to
become the equivalent of separate Being (E 1,1026a23-32; K 2, 1064b6-14) - theology 研究神 ──由於有種科學研究存有作為存有以及獨立的存有，我們必須研究此科學究竟跟物理學相同，或者是獨立的知識分枝。物理學處理的事物包含動因於自身之中，數學這種理論科學乃是處理永恆卻無法分離存在的事物。因此，有種科學跟前兩種都不同，處理的是分離的跟不動的事物﹔如果真的有這樣的實體（分離的跟不變的）是我們的科學想要證明的。如果真有這樣的實體的話，他必定就是神性的，也必定就是最初的、最根本的原理。“Since
there is a science of Being qua Being and separately existent, we must inquire
whether this should be regarded as identical with natural science or rather as
distinct branch of knowledge. Physics deals with things which contain a source
of motion in themselves, and mathematics is speculative and is a science which
deal with permanent things, but not with things which can exist separately.
Hence there is a science distinct from both of these, which deals with that
which exists separately and is immovable; that is, if there really is a
substance of this kind – I mean separately existent and immovable – as we
shall endeavor to prove. And if there is an entity of this kind in the world of
reality, here surely must be the Divine, and this must be the first and most
fundamental principle.” (K 7, 1064a28) cf. E 1, 1026a19-23 -
the science of ousia (B
2, 996b31;997a1-2; Z 1, 1028b4-7; L
1, 1069a18) ; science of primary ousia (G
3, 1005a35) ; of the causes of ousiai (G
2, 1003b18; H 1, 1042a5; L
1, 1069a18-19); of the causes of the visible divine things (E 1, 1026a16-18) - the science of truth (A 3, 983b2-3) §2. The Role of Substance in the
Study of Being Qua Being Book G
1003a : œstin
™pist»mh tij ¼ qewre‹ tÕ Ôn Î
Ôn : « il existe une certaine tenue,
un certain maintien, qui consiste à prendre en vue l’étant par où
il est » 有某種堅持，面對著存有作為存有 ™pist»mh
< ™f…stamai , se tenir auprès de 在∼之旁->
™p…stasij, être en place devant在∼之前 ;
se tenir face à quelque chose面對某物 但是，Aristotle接下來在1003a24立刻規定著此種科學乃是™piskope‹
kaqÒlou perˆ toà Ôntoj Î Ôn (qui
fait des visées catholiques au sujet de l’étant par où il
est étant 從普遍方面考慮存有作為存有)-( kaqÒlou, l’universel, 普遍者ce qui embrasse toute chose,包含著所有的東西，in :
de generatione, I, 3, 317b7 ; perišcein,
embrasser = envelopper包含,
délimiter限定、界定, in Physique, III, 6,
207a31-32) ﹔其次，從tÕ
Ôn的多義性著手討論，針對具普遍性的，有關存有之類比analogia來討論：存有既不是同義的homonyme
(equivocal)，也不是同名的synonyme
(univocal)。因此，從四個方面來說存有──範疇、潛在／現實、實體／偶然、真理／虛假。 存有to on, tÕ Ôn之多重意義 Book 5 (Book Delta) 1017a7 ：存有的義含可從1)偶然的，2)本性的，這兩種方面來說。1)偶然的(kat¦
sumbebhkÕj),
X is Y之中，Y為X的偶性，例如，the white man is
cultured, the cultured person is white, 之中，man, cultured, white
是偶然的關連。但是，偶然的述詞可以指向主詞，也可指向存有。2)本性的，本質的，意指著，從述詞的形態來決定。這裡也可謂，absolute
Being, tÕ d? kaq᾿
aØtÒ,
因此，Being所有的多重義含，也就隨著述詞的多重義含而來，像是，指著－一個事物是什麼，其性質、數量、關係、主動被動、地方、時間。3)除了偶然跟本性的含意外，to
be 等同於真的(tÕ
œstin Óti ¢lhqšj)，not
to be等同於虛假的(tÕ
d? m¾ e?nai Óti oÙk ¢lhq?j ¢ll¦ yeàdoj)。4)最後，to
be (is) 也表示著潛在地是或現實地是(œti
tÕ e?nai shma…nei kaˆ tÕ ×n tÕ m?n dun£mei
·htÕn tÕ d'
™ntelece…v
tîn e„rhmšnwn toÚtwn·)。 Book
6 (Book E) 1026a34: being的多義性，有時說的是偶然的東西，有時乃真的東西，此外還有範疇方面，例如，如何（to
ti），性質，量，地方，時間。等等。還有關於潛在的跟現實的義含。--通常以為，偶然的東西（the
accidental）接近不存有的東西(non-existent)。但是，必定要有偶然，來說明不是必然存在、永恆存在的事物。其次，關於存有之於真假，則須指出，真假預設著主詞跟述詞的結合、分離，而且真假存在於思想之中，不再事物之中，因此，跟存有作為存有的義含截然有別。 Book 7
(Book Zeta) 1028a10 : 存有指著各個範疇，如一事物的如何to ti esti（即個別性tode
ti, tode tˆ），性質，數量等等。但是，所有意義的根本是如何tÒ
tˆ ™stin, to ti estin，指向實體ousia。 即使，tÕ
Ôn 多義性具有多義性，但是此乃環繞一個中心觀念的多重面貌，只是，究竟是哪種中心觀念則未曾言明。範疇、潛在現實、偶然／本性、真假這四種面貌並非對存有tÕ
Ôn的定義。Ôn
Î Ôn無法被定義﹔因為定義、界定乃是指出種跟種差﹔但是，存有比種還要普遍，就它乃最普遍的，超越種的這點來說，中世紀就將存有說成是一種超越物（transcendentia），跟美、真、善、一都是超越項termini transcendentales。只能從消極的方面來說。例如，在後分析篇中說，存有不是任何物的實體（II,7,92b13-14,
oÙk œsti oÙs…a
oÙdeni）﹔在論詮釋裡說，不是任何實際物的意義（3, 16b22-23, oÙk œsti sÁmeion toà pr£gmatoj），甚至說，依照它本身，什麼都不是（aÙtÕ
g¦r oÙd?n ™sti），只不過它總是預先指著複合物（pro-shma…nei tina sÚnqes…n）3,16b23-24。它既是貧乏的、也是很有力的，所指總是超過自己prÒj，它跟所有的實際物有別，不指向它們，無所指卻揭露一切。由於，有很多種方式說存有tÕ
Ôn，但是卻又不是同義詞的（synonyme,
kaq/›n）也不是同名的（homonyme, kat¦ poll¦），開啟了一個新領域(prÒj
›n)介於兩者之間，此乃類比的領域。 §3. What is Substance? 實體 在Book Z中，開始對於實體的討論探究，首先，亞理士多德重複有關存有的多義性，而其中的首要意義乃是指，一個事物的實體(tosautacîj d? legomšnou toà Ôntoj fanerÕn Óti toÚtwn prîton ×n tÕ t… ™stin, Óper shma…nei t¾n oÙs…an) -- 1028a14-15。因此就實體的優先性使得何謂存有者的問題轉為何謂實體的問題(t… tÕ Ôn, toàtÒ ™sti t…j ¹ oÙs…a) -- 1028b4。從範疇論已經有某種回答，其中是以個別的人或馬為原始實體的例子，而原初實體乃「既不在托體中也不被托體所說及」（2a10）；但是形上學Book Z中並未採取此種原初實體的判準。Book Z 2中亞理士多德列舉了哪些是實體的事物──物體（包含有植物、動物、動植物的部份，元素、天體），比物體更基本的事物（點、線、面），不可感知的事物（理型、數學對象）。亞理士多德並未懷疑最清楚的實體之例乃是可感知的事物，只是問題仍然開放。但是在回答有關例子的問題時，亞理士多德認為要先回答判準的問題：什麼是個實體？消極的判準，如範疇論所說的，只告訴我們，什麼事物為實體。但如果我們知道什麼是實體，也應該能說什麼使他成為實體，也就是實體的原因。要回答此問題，要辨認出實體跟事物的關連性。 Book D 8, 1017b10: 1 )簡單物體simple bodies，2)being immanent in such things as are not predicated of substrate, is the cause of their being, 例如，靈魂是動物存有的原因，3)all parts immanent in things which define and indicate their individuality, and whose destruction causes the destruction of the whole，內在的部份可規定著事物的個別性，而此部份的毀滅也導致全體的毀滅。4)本質essence, tÕ t… Ïn e?nai (quod quid erat esse, that which each thing already was in its thingness, before it became actual, -- Heidegger, The basic problems of phenomenology, p.85)。──＞2 senses : 1) the ultimate subject (to hypokeimenon eschaton, tÕ Øpoke…menon), which cannot be further predicated of something else, 最終的托體，不在被任何詞項所述定。2) whatever has an individual and separate existence, e.x. shape, form of each particular thing. 個別（tÒde ti）而分離的東西。 Book Z 1, 1028 a30-31: (Clearly then it is by reason of the substance that each of the things referred to exists.) Hence that which is primarily, not in a qualified sense but absolutely, will be substance; 1028b4 : what is Being ? = what is substance ? Book Z 1, 1028 b33-36 : The term “substance” is spoken of in four main senses: essence (tÕ t… Ïn e?nai), the universal (tÕ kaqÒlou), the genus (tÕ gšnoj), the underlying subject (tÕ Øpoke…menon). 四種實體：本質，共相，種類，托體 Book L, 1, 1069a30 : three kinds of substance – 1) sensible, eternal or 2) sensible, perishable ; 3) immutable, which exist separately ; 三種實體：1)感性的，包含，1永恆的與2會消逝的，3)不變的。「如果宇宙被當作一個整體，實體乃是其第一個部份；而如果宇宙被當作連續體，實體乃是最先的，其次是性質、數量。」1069a19-21 §4. Substance, Matter-Form, and
Subject Book Z 3 首先列出四種可能的選項：本質、共相、種類、托體。此中的義含乃是。如果說X是個實體，那麼，X的實體屬於下列幾項的可能：1)X的本質；2)X的某些普遍述詞，3)X所屬的種類，4)X所被述及的托體。Book Z 3所先探討的乃是托體作為實體的可能。 托體乃是「所有其他事物都被它所述及，但它本身不被任何事物所述及」（1028b36）。這個說法似乎重複了範疇論的關於實體的界定。但有兩點差異：範疇論中的實體乃是述定作用中的最終實體，但形上學中只說明著，事物的實體是什麼。X的實體就只是一個由X所述定的托體（a subject that x is predicated of）。其次，亞理士多德所指的不像範疇論所關心的問題般，此中的實體並非形式也非物質也非兩者的組合。主要觀念來自物理學，而非範疇論。 §5. Substance and Essence 實體與本質
§8. Substances as Hylomorphic Compounds 實體與形質的混合 §9. Substance and Definition (Z10-11) Z10, 1034b20-22 §10. Substances and Universals (Z13) §11. Substance as Cause of Being (Z17) Z17, 1041a9: ™peˆ
oân ¹ oÙs…a ¢rc¾ kaˆ a„t…a tij
™st…n, ™nteàqen
metitšon 關於原因（a„t…a）的說明，智慧乃是研究原因與原理的知識，必須探求最初的原因，因為只有在認識了事物的第一原因時，才認識了該事物（Book A, 983a24）。原因在四種意義下被說：1)指的是實體或本質e?nai t¾n oÙs…an kaˆ tÕ t… Ïn e?nai，因為最終的理由、為什麼乃是一個原因跟原理。2)指的是質料或托體，t¾n Ûlhn kaˆ tÕ Øpoke…menon ; 3)變化的來源，變化的開端 ¹ ¢rc¾ tÁj kin»sewj，4)跟開端對立的，乃是目的或善，此乃所有生成跟運動的目的tšloj（終點）。 Physics, B, 3, 194b25 : cause = 1) that from which, as a constituent, something is generated, ex. the bronze is a cause of the statue ; 2) the form or the pattern, this being the formula of essence, and also the genera of this; ex. In the octave, the ratio 2:1, and in general, a number and the parts in the formula (logos, lÒgoj) ; 3)that from which change or coming to rest first begins, ex. Father is the cause of the baby, in general, that which act is a cause of that which is acted upon (active / passive) ; 4) the end, the final cause [that for the sake of which] Metaph. Book D 3, 1013a24 : cause -- 1)as the result of whose presence something comes into being, 因為其呈現，使得某物變為存有的。2) the form or pattern, that is, the essential formula (logos) and the classes which contain it 定義以及包含定義的類。3) the source of the first beginning of change or rest, 變化或靜止的最初開端。4) the same as end, i.e. the final cause (toàto d/ ™stˆ tÕ oá ›kena), 它乃是讓事物為了它的緣故而是。 §12. Actuality and Potentiality 現實與潛在 Metaph. Book D 3, 1013a24 : 'Potency' means (1) a source of movement or change, which is in another thing than the thing moved or in the same thing qua other; e.g. the art of building is a potency which is not in the thing built, while the art of healing, which is a potency, may be in the man healed, but not in him qua healed. 'Potency' then means the source, in general, of change or movement in another thing or in the same thing qua other, and also (2) the source of a thing's being moved by another thing or by itself qua other. For in virtue of that principle, in virtue of which a patient suffers anything, we call it 'capable' of suffering; and this we do sometimes if it suffers anything at all, sometimes not in respect of everything it suffers, but only if it suffers a change for the better--(3) The capacity of performing this well or according to intention; for sometimes we say of those who merely can walk or speak but not well or not as they intend, that they cannot speak or walk. So too (4) in the case of passivity--(5) The states in virtue of which things are absolutely impassive or unchangeable, or not easily changed for the worse, are called potencies; for things are broken and crushed and bent and in general destroyed not by having a potency but by not having one and by lacking something, and things are impassive with respect to such processes if they are scarcely and slightly affected by them, because of a 'potency' and because they 'can' do something and are in some positive state. §13. Unity Revisited §14. Substance Eternal and Immutable 永恆不動的實體 = theology －神學乃研究運動之第一原理的科學 －關於神、不動的推動者之性質：1)此實體乃不毀滅、永恆的；2)此實體乃運動之生產原理，本身是永恆而根本地實現著（in act）。3)此永恆實體乃非物質性的，因為，物質的規定乃屬於偶然因。4)非物質性的實體有純粹叡智（intelligible）的原理。叡智（intellect, tÕ nohtÒn）之特質乃思惟－「其尊嚴在於思惟」（1074b27）。其次，它不以外在對象為其思惟對象，否則將依賴另一個原理，而且會有運動（由完美變為惡劣1074b19-27），故而，它以自己為思惟對象。5)思惟自身，表示叡智原理有原理的自足性（autarky, aÙt£rkeia）；相對地，此現實的叡智是其他物的欲求對象，是其愛的對象。6) 此種完全自足的實體乃是目的因（Book, 5, 1013a33）；但此目的不在宇宙中，非宇宙之完成與原因。它是最初的動因，是全體的組織力量。但也跟希伯來人創世紀的造物主有所不同。 §15. Glossary of Aristotelian Terminology -
Accident: sumbebhkÕj,
sumbebêkos 偶然 -
Accidental: kat¦
sumbebhkÕj, kata
sumbebêkos 偶然的 -
Account: logos
說明 -
Actuality: energeia,
entelecheia 現實、實現；圓極 -
Alteration: alloiôsis
變異 -
Affirmative: kataphatikos
肯定 -
Assertion: apophansis
(sentence with a truth value, declarative sentence) 肯定 -
Assumption: hupothesis
假設 -
Attribute: pathos
屬性 -
Axiom: axioma
公設 -
Be: einai 有，存有 -
Being(s): on,
onta 存有，存有者 -
Belong: huparchein
隸屬 -
Category: katêgoria
範疇 -
Cause: aition,
aitia 原因 -
Come to be: gignesthai
-
Coming to be: genesis
-
Contradict: antiphanai
-
Contradiction: antiphasis
(in the sense “contradictory pair of propositions” and also in the sense
“denial of a proposition”) -
Contrary: enantion
-
Definition: horos,
horismos 界定 -
Demonstration: apodeixis
-
Denial (of a
proposition): apophasis -
Dialectic: dialektikê
辯證法 -
Differentia: diaphora;
specific difference, eidopoios diaphora 種差 -
Distinctive: idios,
idion -
End: telos 目的 -
Essence: tÕ
t… Ïn e?nai , to
ti ên einai, tÕ t… ™stin,
to ti esti 本質 -
Essential: en tôi
ti esti, en tôi ti ên einai (of predications); kath’
hauto (of attributes) -
Exist: einai 存在 -
Explanation: aition, aitia -
Final cause: hou
heneka (literally, “what something is for”) -
Form: eidos, morphê
-
Formula: logos
-
Function: ergon
-
Genus: genos -
Homonymous: homônumon
-
Immediate: amesos
-
Impossible: adunaton
-
In respect of itself: kath’
hauto -
Individual: atomon,
tode ti -
Induction: epagôgê -
Infinite: apeiron -
Kind: genos, eidos
-
Knowledge: epistêmê
-
Matter: hulê
-
Nature: phusis
-
Negation (of a term): apophasis
否定 -
Particular: en
merei, epi meros (of a proposition); kath’hekaston (of
individuals) -
Peculiar: idios,
idion -
Per se: kath’
hauto 本性的，自存的 -
Perception: aisthêsis
-
Perplexity: aporia
-
Possible: dunaton,
endechomenon; endechesthai (verb: “be possible”) -
Potentially: dunamei
-
Potentiality: dunamis
-
Predicate: katêgorein
(verb); katêegoroumenon(“what is predicated”) -
Predication: katêgoria
(act or instance of predicating, type of predication) -
Principle: archê
(starting point of a demonstration) -
Qua: hêi
-
Quality: poion
-
Quantity: poson
-
Refute: elenchein;
refutation, elenchos -
Separate: chôriston
-
Said in many ways: pollachôs
legetai -
Science: epistêmê
-
Soul: psuchê
-
Species: eidos
-
Specific: eidopoios
(of a differentia that “makes a species”, eidopoios diaphora) -
Subject: tÕ
Øpoke…menon, hupokeimenon
托體 -
Substance: oÙs…a,
ousia 實體 -
Term: horos -
This: tode ti
-
Universal: katholou
(both of propositions and of individuals) - Wisdom: sophia Aristotole
在 Book B, I, 995b4-996a17 提出了14個問題待解，以下以表列出：
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