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[勞思光] [許國宏] [呂健吉] [郭朝順] [黃冠閔] [伍至學] [龔維正] [陳振崑] [冀劍制] |
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黃冠閔之哲學教學網
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Edmund
Husserl, THE CRISIS OF EUROPEAN SCIENCES and the transcendental phenomenolgy
(tr.
David Carr) (§37-§55) [142] § 37. The formal and most general structures of the life-world: thing and
world on the one side, thing-consciousness on the other. IF WE SEEK OUT, simply looking around us, what is formal and general, what remains
invariant in the life-world throughout all alterations of the relative, we
involuntarily stop at what alone determines for us in life the sense of talking
about the world: the world is the universe of things, which are distributed
within the world-form of space-time and are "positional" in two senses
(according to spatial position and temporal position) - the spatiotemporal onta. Here would thus be found the task of a life-world ontology, understood as
a concretely general doctrine of essence for these onta. For
our interest in the present context it suffices to have indicated this. Rather
than spend our time here, we prefer to move on to a task which is much greater,
as will soon be seen-one which in fact encompasses such a doctrine. In order to
prepare the way for this new subject of investigation, which also essentially
concerns the life-world but is not ontological, we shall undertake a general
reflection-we, that is, as waking, living human beings in the life-world (and
thus naturally within the epoche regarding all interference of positive
scientific discipline). This general reflection will at
the same time have the function of making evident an essential distinction
among the possible ways in which the pregiven world, the ontic universe [das ontische Universum], can become thematic for us.
Calling to mind what has repeatedly been said: the life-world, for us who
wakingly live in it, is always already there, existing in advance for us, the
"ground" of all praxis whether theoretical or extratheoretical.
The world is pregiven to us, the waking, always somehow practically
interested subjects, not occasionally but always and necessarily as the
universal field of all actual and possible praxis, as horizon. To live is always
to live-in-certainty-of-theworld. Waking life is being awake to the world,
being constantly and directly "conscious" of the world and of oneself
as living in the world, actually experiencing [erleben] and actually effecting the ontic certainty of the world. The world is pregiven
thereby, in every case, in such a way that individual things are given. But
there exists a fundamental difference between the way we are conscious of the
world and the way we are conscious of things or objects (taken in the broadest
sense, but still purely in the sense of the life-world), though together the two
make up an inseparable unity. Things, objects (always understood purely in
the sense of the life-world), are "given" as being valid for us in
each case (in some mode or other of ontic certainty) but in principle only in
such a way that we are conscious of them as things or objects within the world-horizon. Each one is something, "something of"
the world of which we are constantly conscious as a horizon. On the other hand,
we are conscious of this horizon only as a horizon for existing objects; without
particular objects of consciousness it cannot be actual [aktuell]. Every object has its possible
varying modes of being valid, the modalizations of ontic certainty. The world,
on the other hand, does not exist as an entity, as an object, but exists
with such uniqueness that the plural makes no sense when applied to it. Every
plural, and every singular drawn from it, presupposes the world-horizon. This
difference between the manner of being of an object in the world and that of the
world itself obviously prescribes fundamentally different correlative types
of consciousness for them. § 38. The two possible fundamental ways of making the life-world thematic:
the naäve and natural straightforward attitude and the idea of a
consistently reflective attitude toward the "how" of the subjective
manner of givenness of life-world and life-world objects. THESE MOST
GENERAL features of waking life make up the formal framework
within which it now becomes possible to distinguish the different ways this life
is carried on, though in all cases the world is pregiven and, within this
horizon, objects are given. These ways result in the different manners, we could
also [144] say, in which we are awake to the world and to the objects in the world.
The first, the naturally normal one which absolutely must precede the others not
for accidental but for essential reasons, is that of straightforwardly living
toward whatever objects are given, thus toward the world-horizon, in normal,
unbroken constancy, in a synthetic coherence running through all acts. This
normal, straightforward living, toward whatever objects are given, indicates
that all our interests have their goals in objects. The pregiven world is the
horizon which includes all our goals, all our ends, whether fleeting or lasting,
in a flowing but constant manner, just as an intentional
horizon-consciousness implicitly "encompasses" [everything] in
advance. We, the subjects, in our normal, unbroken, coherent life, know no goals
which extend beyond this; indeed we have no idea that there could be others. All
our theoretical and practical themes, we can also say, lie always within the
normal coherence of the life-horizon "world." World is the universal
field into which all our acts, whether of experiencing, of knowing, or of
outward action, are directed. From this field, or from objects in each case
already given, come all affections, transforming themselves in each case into
actions. Yet there can be a completely different sort of waking life involved in
the conscious having of the world. It would consist in a transformation of the
thematic consciousness of the world which breaks through the normality of
straightforward living. Let us direct our attention to the fact that in general
the world or, rather, objects are not merely pregiven to us all in such a way
that we simply have them as the substrates of their properties but that we
become conscious of them (and of everything ontically meant) through
subjective manners of appearance, or manners of givenness, without noticing it
in particular; in fact we are for the most part not even aware of it at all. Let
us now shape this into a new universal direction of interest; let us establish a
consistent universal interest in the "how" of the manners of givenness
and in the onta themselves, not straightforwardly but rather as objects in respect
to their "how"-- that is, with our interest exclusively and constantly
directed toward how, throughout the alteration of relative validities, subjective appearances,
and opinions, the coherent, universal validity world
-- the
world
--comes into being for us; how, that is,
there arises in us the constant consciousness of the universal existence,
of the universal horizon, of real, actually existing objects, [145 each of which we are conscious of
only through the alterations of our relative conceptions [Aufassungen]
of it, of its manners of
appearing, its modes of validity, even when we are conscious of it in
particularity as something simply being there. In this total change of interest, carried out with a new consistency
founded on a particular resolve of the will, we notice that we acquire a number
of never thematically investigated types, not only of individual things but also
of syntheses, in an inseparable synthetic totality which is constantly produced
by intentionally overlapping horizon-validities; and the latter influence
each other reciprocally in the form of corroborating verifications of existence,
or refuting cancelings-out, or other modalizations. This is the essential
character of the synthetic totality in which we can take possession of something
previously completely unknown, something never envisioned or grasped as a task
for knowledge; this is the universal accomplishing life in which the world comes
to be as existing for us constantly in flowing particularity, constantly "pregiven"
to us. We can also say: this is the synthetic totality in which we now discover,
for the first time, that and how the world, as correlate of a discoverable
universe of synthetically connected accomplishments, acquires its ontic
meaning and its ontic validity in the totality of its ontic [ontische] structures. But here we do not need to go into more detailed expositions, into
everything that can become thematic. What is essential for us here is the
distinction between the two types of investigation,' each regarded as a
universal investigation. The natural life, whether it is prescientifically or scientifically,
theoretically or practically interested, is life within a universal unthematic
horizon. This horizon is, in the natural attitude, precisely the world always
pregiven as that which exists. Simply living on in this manner, one does not
need the word "pregiven"; there is no need to point out that the world
is constantly actuality for pus. All natural questions, all theoretical and
practical goals taken as themes -- as existing, as perhaps existing, as
probable, as questionable, as valuable, as project, as action and result of
action -- have to do with something or other within the world-horizon. This is true
even of illusions, nonactualities, since everything characterized through
some modality of being is, after all, related to actual being. For, in advance,
"world" has the meaning "the universe of the `actually' existing
actualities": not the merely supposed, doubtful, or questionable
actualities but the actual ones, which as such have actuality for us only in the
constant movement of corrections and revisions of validities [Umgeltungen von Geltungen]- all this considered as the anticipation of an ideal unity. Instead of persisting in this manner of
"straightforwardly living into the world," let us attempt a universal
change of interest in which the new expression "pregivenness of the
world" becomes necessary because it is the title for this differently
directed and yet again universal theme of the manners of pregivenness. In
other words, nothing shall interest us but precisely that subjective alteration
of manners of givenness, of manners of appearing and of the modes of validity in
them, which, in its constant process, synthetically connected as it incessantly
flows on, brings about the coherent consciousness of the straightforward
"being" of the world. Among the objects of the life-world we also find human
beings, with all their human action and concern, works and suffering, living in
common in the world-horizon in their particular social interrelations and
knowing themselves to be such. All this, too, then, shall be included as we
carry out our new universal direction of interest. A coherent theoretical
interest shall now be directed exclusively toward the universe of the
subjective, in which the world, in virtue of the universality of synthetically
bound accomplishments in this universe, comes to have its straightforward
existence for us. In the natural and normal world-life this subjective manifold
constantly goes on, but there it remains constantly and necessarily concealed.
How, by what method, is it to be revealed? Can it be shown to be a self-enclosed
universe with its own theoretical and consistently maintained inquiry,
revealing itself as the all-encompassing unity of ultimately functioning and
accomplishing subjectivity which is to account for the existence of the world--
the world for us, our natural life-horizon? If this is a legitimate and a
necessary task, its execution implies the creation of a new science of a
peculiar sort. In opposition to all previously designed objective sciences,
which are sciences on the ground of the world, this would be a science of the
universal how of the pregivenness of the world, i.e., of what makes it a
universal ground for any sort of objectivity. And included in this is the
creation of a science of the ultimate grounds [Gründe] which supply the true force of all
objective [147 grounding, the force arising from its ultimate bestowal
of meaning. Our historically motivated path,
moving from the interpretation of the interplay of problems between Hume and Kant, has now led us to the postulate of
clarifying the pregiven world's character of universally "being the
ground" for all objective sciences and-what followed of itself-for all
objective praxis; it has led us, then, to the postulate of that novel universal
science of subjectivity as pregiving the world. We shall now have to see how we
can fulfill this postulate. We notice thereby that the first step which seemed
to help at the beginning, that epochs through which we freed ourselves from all
objective sciences as grounds of validity, by no means suffices. In carrying out
this epochs, we obviously continue to stand on the ground of the world; it is
now reduced to the life-world which is valid for us prescientifically; it is
just that we may use no sort of knowledge arising from the sciences as premises,
and we may take the sciences into consideration only as historical facts, taking
no position of our own on their truth. But nothing about this affects our interested looking-around in the
prescientifically intuited world or our paying attention to its relative
features. In a certain way, concern with this sort of thing belongs continually
even to [one type of] objective investigation, namely, that of the
historians, who must, after all, reconstruct the changing, surrounding
life-worlds of the peoples and periods with which they deal. In spite of this,
the pregiven world is still valid as a ground [for them] and has not been
transposed into the universe of the purely subjective, a universal framework in
its own right, which is our concern now. The same thing holds [even] if we take as our subject
of investigation, in the unity of a systematic survey, all [historical] periods
and peoples and finally the entire spatiotemporal world, paying constant
attention to the relativity of the surrounding life-worlds of particular human
beings, peoples, and periods as mere matters of fact. It is clear that the same
thing is true of this world survey, in the form of an iterated synthesis of
relative, spatiotemporal life-worlds, that is true of a survey of one such
life-world individually. It is taken one part at a time and then, at a higher
level, one surrounding world, one temporal period, at a time; each particular
intuition [yields] an ontic validity, whether in the mode of actuality or
possibility. As each intuition occurs, it presupposes others having objective
validity -- presupposes for us, the observers, the general ground of the validity
of the world. [148 § 39. The
peculiar character of the transcendental epoche as a total change of the natural
attitude of life. Now,
How can the pregivenness of the
life-world become a universal subject of investigation in its own right?
Clearly, only through a total change of the natural attitude, such that
we no longer live, as heretofore, as human beings within natural existence,
constantly effecting the validity of the pregiven world; rather, we must
constantly deny ourselves this. Only in this way can we arrive at the
transformed and novel subject of investigation, "pregivenness of the world
as such": the world purely and exclusively as-- and in respect to how -- it has
meaning and ontic validity, and continually attains these in new forms, in our
conscious life. Only thus can we study what the world is as the ground-validity
for natural life, with all its projects and undertakings, and,
correlatively, what natural life and its subjectivity ultimately are,
i.e., purely as the subjectivity which functions here in effecting validity. The
life which effects world-validity in natural world-life does not permit of being
studied from within the attitude of natural world-life. What is required, then,
is a total transformation of attitude, a completely unique, universal
epoche. § 40. The
difficulties surrounding the genuine sense of performing the total epoche. The
temptation to misconstrue it as a withholding of all individual validities,
carried out step by step. THE
UNIVERSALITY of the epoche in regard to the totality of natural
and normal life does indeed have an incomparable, peculiar character, and as
such it is at first open to question in [149 In order to gain a conception of how this total
transformation of attitude is to be carried out, let us consider again the
style of natural, normal life. There we move in a current of ever new
experiences, judgments, valuations, decisions. In each of these acts the ego is
directed toward objects in its surrounding world, dealing with them in
one way or another. It is of them that we are conscious in these acts
themselves, sometimes simply as actual, sometimes in modalities of actuality
(for example, as possible, as doubtful, etc. ). None of these acts, and none of
the validities involved in them, is isolated: in their intentions they
necessarily imply an infinite horizon of inactive [inaktuelle] validities
which function with them in flowing mobility. The manifold acquisitions of
earlier active life are not dead sediments; even the background (for example,
that of the perceptual field), of which we are always concurrently conscious but
which is momentarily irrelevant and remains completely unnoticed, still
functions according to its implicit validities. All things of this sort, even
though they are momentarily not actualized, are in a constant motion involving
modes of being awakened, immediately or mediately, and modes of affecting
the ego and possibly passing over into active apperception, intervening as
validities in the complex of acts. Thus the particular object of our active
consciousness, and correlatively the active, conscious having of it, being
directed toward it, and dealing with it -- all this is forever surrounded by an
atmosphere of mute, concealed, but cofunctioning validities, a vital horizon into
which the active ego can also direct itself voluntarily, reactivating old
acquisitions, consciously grasping new apperceptive ideas, transforming them
into intuitions. Because of this constantly flowing horizonal character, then,
every straightforwardly performed validity in natural world-life always
presupposes validities extending back, immediately or mediately, into a
necessary subsoil of obscure but occasionally available reactivatable
validities, all of which together, including the present acts, make up a single
indivisible, interrelated complex of life. This
consideration is of significance for the clarification of [150] how the universal epoche is to be performed. We see,
namely, that as an abstention from performing validity, carried out in
individual steps, it cannot lead to the goal. The abstention from performing individual validities (similar to the
way this occurs in a critical attitude, caused by theoretical or practical
demands) only creates for each instance a new mode of validity on the natural
ground of the world; and the situation is not improved if we wish to exercise,
through an anticipatory, universal resolve, the abstention from the performance,
one by one, of all validities, even to infinity, i.e., in respect to all of
one's own or alien validities which from now on could ever suggest themselves. Instead of this universal abstention in individual steps, a completely
different sort of universal epoche is possible, namely, one which puts out of
action, with one blow, the total performance running through the whole of
natural world-life and through the whole network (whether concealed or open) of
validities-precisely that total performance which, as the coherent
"natural attitude," makes up "simple"
"straightforward" ongoing life. Through the abstention which inhibits
this whole hitherto unbroken way of life a complete transformation of all of
life is attained, a thoroughly new way of life. An attitude is arrived at which
is above the pregivenness of the validity of the world, above the infinite complex whereby, in concealment, the world's validities are
always founded on other validities, above the
whole manifold but synthetically unified flow in which the world has and forever
attains anew its content of meaning and its ontic validity. In other words, we
thus have an attitude above
the universal conscious life (both
individual-subjective and intersubjective) through which the world is
"there" for those naively absorbed in ongoing life, as unquestionably
present, as the universe of what is there,1 as the field of all acquired and
newly established life-interests. They are all put out of action in advance by
the epoche, and with them the whole natural ongoing life which is directed
toward the actualities of "the" world. It is to be noted also that the present, the "transcendental"
epoche is meant, of course, as a habitual attitude which we resolve to take up
once and for all. Thus it is by no means a 1. als fraglos vorhandene, als Universum der
Vorhandenheiten. [151] epoche, in comparing it with
vocational attitudes, still holds during "vocational time," while it
does put all other interests "out of play," it by no means gives up
their manner of being as belonging to us (or our own manner of being as those
who are "interested"), as if we were to sacrifice them or even
reconsider whether or not they should continue to be upheld. But we must also
not forget what was said as a protest against a degrading equation [of this]
with other vocations and what was said about the possibility of radically
changing all human existence through this epoche which reaches into its
philosophical depths. §
41. The genuine transcendental epoche makes
possible the "transcendental reduction"the discovery and
investigation of the transcendental correlation between world and
world-consciousness. WE PERFORM
the epoche--
we who are philosophizing
in a new way-- as a transformation of the attitude which precedes it not
accidentally but essentially, namely, the attitude of natural human existence
which, in its total historicity, in life and science, was never before
interrupted. But it is necessary, now, to make really transparent the fact that
we are not left with a meaningless, habitual abstention; rather, it is through
this abstention that the gaze of the philosopher in truth first becomes fully
free: above all, free of the strongest and most universal, and at the same time
most hidden, internal bond, namely, of the pregivenness of the world. Given in
and through this liberation is the discovery of the universal, absolutely
self-enclosed and absolutely self-sufficient correlation between the world
itself and world-consciousness. By the latter is meant the conscious life of the
subjectivity which effects the validity of the world, the subjectivity
which always has the world in its enduring acquisitions and continues actively
to shape it anew. And there results, finally, taken in the broadest sense,
the absolute correlation between beings of every sort and every meaning, on
the one hand, and absolute subjectivity, as constituting meaning and ontic [152] validity in this broadest manner, on the other hand.
What must be shown in particular and above all is that through the epoche a new
way of experiencing, of thinking, of theorizing, is opened to the philosopher;
here, situated above his own natural being and above the natural world, he loses
nothing of their being and their objective truths and likewise nothing at all of
the spiritual acquisitions of his world-life or those of the whole
historical communal life; he simply forbids himself --as a philosopher, in
the uniqueness of his direction of interest -- to continue the whole natural
performance of his world-life; that is, he forbids himself to ask questions
which rest upon the ground of the world at hand, questions of being, questions
of value, practical questions, questions about being or not-being, about being
valuable, being useful, being beautiful, being good, etc. All natural interests
are put out of play. But the world, exactly as it was for me earlier and still
is, as my world, our world, humanity's world, having validity in its various
subjective ways, has not disappeared; it is just that, during the consistently
carried-out epoche, it is under our gaze purely as the correlate of the
subjectivity which gives it ontic meaning, through whose validities 1 the
world "is" at all. This is not a "view," an
"interpretation" bestowed upon the world. Every view about . . . ,
every opinion about "the" world, has its ground in the pregiven world.
It is from this very ground that I have freed myself through the epoche; I stand
above the world, which has now become for me, in a quite
peculiar sense, a phenomenon. §
42. The task of concretely plotting ways in
which the transcendental reduction can actually be carried out. BUT HOW IS THE indicated accomplishment, made possible by the
epoche-- we call it the "transcendental reduction"- and how is the
scientific task which is thus opened up to be made understandable in more
concrete terms? [We are referring to the] accomplishment of a reduction of
"the" world to the transcendental phenomenon "world," a
reduction thus also to its 1.
Reading Geltungen for Gelten. [153] correlate, transcendental subjectivity, in and through
whose "conscious life" the world, valid for us straightforwardly and
naively prior to all science, attains and always has attained its whole content
and ontic validity. How can we make it more concretely understandable that the
reduction of mankind to the phenomenon "mankind," which is included as
part of the reduction of the world, makes it possible to recognize mankind
as a self-objectification of transcendental subjectivity which is always
functioning ultimately and is thus "absolute"? How does it become
possible, thanks to the epoche, to display this subjectivity in its
accomplishment, in its transcendental "conscious life," extending into
hidden subsoils, in the distinct manners in which it "brings about,"
within itself, the world as ontic meaning? How can we bring this to light with
self-evidence, not inventing or mythically constructing? If this is a matter of
a new sort of scientific discipline, of a new sort of theoretical questioning
and resolving of questions, then the ground for these questions, too, must be
prepared. Natural questions about the world have their ground in the pregiven
world as the world of actual and possible experiences. And the gaze made free by
the epoche must likewise be, in its own way, an experiencing gaze. [But] the
accomplishment of the total transformation of attitude must consist in the
fact that the infinity of actual and possible world-experience transforms itself
into the infinity of actual and possible "transcendental
experience," in which, as a first step, the world and the natural
experience of it are experienced as "phenomenon." But how do we begin this, and how
do we progress? How, at first concretely feeling our way, do we attain our first
results, even if only as material for new reflections through which the method
of systematic progressive work and, at the same time, the genuine and pure sense
of our whole project and the quite peculiar character of this new scientific
discipline will become fully clear? The following reflections will show how much
such material is needed when we no longer move on the old familiar ground of the
world but rather stand, through our transcendental reduction, only at the
gate of entrance to the realm, never before entered, of the "mothers of
knowledge"; 1 they will show how great the temptation is, here,
to misunderstand oneself and how much-- indeed, ultimately, the actual success of
a transcendental philosophy -- depends upon self-reflective clarity carried
to its limits. 1.
Cf. Faust, Part II, line 6216. [154] §43.
Characterization of a new way to the reduction, as contrasted with the
"Cartesian way." WE WISH TO PROCEED, here, by beginning anew, starting purely from
natural world-life, and by asking after the how
of the world's pregivenness. At first we understand the
question of the world's pregivenness just as it arises within the natural
attitude and is understandable by all: namely, as the pregivenness of the
world of existing things through the constant alteration of relative
manners of givenness, the world just as it essentially, always, obviously exists
for us, throughout the whole of naturally flowing life, with an inexhaustible
plenitude of what is taken for granted and constantly underlies the alteration
of subjective appearances and validities. As such we now consistently make
the world our subject of investigation, i.e., as the ground of all our interests
and life-projects, among which the theoretical projects of the objective
sciences make up only a particular group. But the latter is now to be in no way
privileged as it was when it motivated our inquiries earlier. In this manner,
then, let our subject now be not the world simply, but the world exclusively as
it is constantly pregiven to us in the alteration of its manners of givenness. At this point novel and ever broadening systematic tasks are opened up within a universal epoche which at first offers itself quite obviously as an immediate necessity. In systematically carrying out the epoche, or reduction, understood in this way, however, we find that in all the tasks it sets it requires a clarification and a transformation of its meaning if the new science is to become capable of being executed in a really concrete way and without absurdity; or if-what amounts to the same thing-it is actually to accomplish a reduction to the absolutely ultimate grounds [Gründe] and to avoid unnoticed, nonsensical admixtures of naturally naive prior validities. Thus we arrive once again at the transcendental epoche which was introduced in advance in our previous presentation in a general way. But now it has not only been enriched by the samples of significant insights attained along the way; it has also attained a self-under [155 standing in principle which
procures for these insights and for the epoche itself their ultimate meaning and
value. I note in passing that the much shorter way to the transcendental epoche in my Ideas toward a Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy, which I call the "Cartesian way" (since it is thought of as being attained merely by reflectively engrossing oneself in the Cartesian epoche of the Meditations while critically purifying it of Descartes's prejudices and confusions), has a great shortcoming: while it leads to the transcendental ego in one leap, as it were, it brings this ego into view as apparently empty of content, since there can be no preparatory explication; so one is at a loss, at first, to know what has been gained by it, much less how, starting with this, a completely new sort of fundamental science, decisive for philosophy, has been attained. Hence also, as the reception of my Ideas showed, it is all too easy right at the very beginning to fall back into the naive-natural attitude-- something that is very tempting in any case.1 § 44. The
life-world as subject matter for a theoretical interest determined by a
universal epoche in respect to the actuality of the things of the life-world. LET US BEGIN our new way by devoting an exclusive, consistently
theoretical interest to the "life-world" as the general
"ground" of human world-life and, specifically, to just the way in
which it fulfills this general "ground" function. Since we seek in
vain in world literature for investigations that could serve as preparatory
studies for us-investigations which might have understood this task as that
of a science in its own right (a peculiar science, to be sure, since it concerns
the disparaged doxa, which now suddenly claims the dignity of a foundation for
science, 1.
It
is to be remembered that the German version of the Cartesian
Meditations had never been released for publication by Husserl.
These
remarks support the theory that Husserl had given up the project of a final version of the Meditations
altogether in favor of the Crisis
as the definitive introduction to phenomenology. [156] episteme)--we ourselves must make a completely new beginning. As is the
case with all undertakings which are new in principle, for which not even an
analogy can serve as guide, this beginning takes place with a certain
unavoidable naïveté. In the beginning is the deed.1 It makes the still insecure
project more definite and at the same time clearer and clearer by means of
samples of successful execution. After this, reflection on method is
required (as the second step) which expressly delimits the general sense of such
a project, the extent to which it can be fulfilled, and the scope of what has
already been accomplished in aspiring to it. We wish, then, to consider the
surrounding life-world concretely, in its neglected relativity and
according to all the manners of relativity belonging essentially to it-the
world in which we live intuitively, together with its real entities [Realitäten]; but [we wish to consider them] as they
give themselves to us at first in straightforward experience, and even
[consider] the ways in which their validity is sometimes in suspense (between
being and illusion, etc. ). Our exclusive task shall be to comprehend precisely
this style, precisely this whole merely subjective and apparently
incomprehensible "Heraclitean flux." Thus we are not concerned with
whether and what the things, the real entities of the world, actually are (their
being actual, their actually being such and such, according to properties,
relations, interconnections, etc.); we are also not concerned with what the
world, taken as a totality, actually is, what in general belongs to it in the
way of a priori structural lawfulness or factual "natural laws." We
have nothing like this as our subject matter. Thus we exclude all knowledge, all
statements about true being and predicative truths for it, such as are required
in active life for its praxis (i.e., situational truths); but we also exclude
all sciences, genuine as well as pseudosciences, with their knowledge of the
world as it is "in itself," in "objective truth." Naturally,
in the present thematic sphere, we also take no part in all the interests which
set any kind of human praxis in motion, especially since the latter, because of
its rootedness in the already existing world, is always at the same time
interested in the true existence or the nonexistence of the things with which it
deals. This involves a type of universal epoche, then, which serves here only to
isolate the subject matter of subsequent investigations, of whose possible
results, by the way, we still have no conception. The motivation arising out of
the need to clarify the 1.
Faust,
Part I, line 1237: "Im Anfang war die Tat." [157] obvious accomplishments of the positive sciences
originally required this topic. But we have already detached ourselves from
this motivation. Deeper reflections are required in order to understand how
this topic can become an independent task, a field of working problems. §
45. Beginnings of a concrete
exposition of what is given in sense-intuition purely as such. ONE OF OUR FIRST steps will have ,to be that of filling in the empty
generality of our theme. As fully "disinterested" 1 spectators
(in the indicated sense of the epoche) of the world For example, there are various
individual things of experience at any given time; I focus on one of them.
To perceive it, even if it is perceived as remaining completely unchanged, is
something very complex: it is to
see it, to touch it, to smell it, to hear it, etc.; and in each case I have
something different. What is seen in seeing is in and for itself other than what
is touched in touching. But in spite of this I say: it is the same thing; it is
only the manners of its sensible exhibition, of course, that are different.
If I remain purely within the realm of seeing, I find new differences, arising
in very manifold form in the course of any normal seeing, which, after all, is a
continuous process; each phase is itself a seeing, but actually what is seen in
each one is something different. I express this somewhat in the following way:
the pure thing seen, what is visible "of" the thing, is first of all a
surface, and in the changing course of seeing I see it now from this
"side," now from that, continuously perceiving it from ever differing
sides. But in them the
surface exhibits itself to me in a continuous
synthesis; each side is for consciousness a manner 1. Reading uninteressierte
for uninteressierter. [158] of exhibition
of it. This implies that, while the
surface is immediately given, I mean more than it offers. Indeed, I have ontic
certainty of this thing [as that] to which all the sides at once belong, and in
the mode in which I see it "best." Each side gives me something o f
the seen thing. In the continuous alteration of seeing, the side just seen 2
ceases being actually still seen, but it is
"retained" and "taken" together with those retained from
before; and thus I "get to know" the thing. Similar observations
should be developed at length in respect to nearness and farness. Even if I stop at perception, I
still have the full consciousness of the thing, just as I already have it
at the first glance when I see it as this thing. In seeing I always
"mean" it with all the sides which are in no way given to me, not even
in the form of intuitive, anticipatory presentifications. Thus every perception
has, "for consciousness," a horizon
belonging to its object (i.e., whatever is meant in the
perception). But considered more exactly, what
we have displayed so far, i.e., what I attribute to the thing itself-for
example, its seen, colored shape in the alteration of near-and-far
orientation--is again something which exhibits itself in manifold ways. I am
speaking now of the alteration of perspectives. The perspectives of the shape and also of its color are
different, but each is in this new way an exhibiting
of -- of this shape, of this color. Something similar
to this can be studied in every modality of the sense-perception (touching,
hearing, etc.) o f the same thing. In the course of alteration they all play their role as
exhibitings, now being interrupted, now beginning again; they offer many types
of manifolds of exhibitings, appearances, each of which functions precisely as
an exhibiting of. In running their course they function in such a way as to form a
sometimes continuous and sometimes discrete synthesis of identification or,
better, of unification. This happens not as a blending of externals; rather, as bearers of
"sense" in each phase, as meaning something, the perspectives combine
in an advancing enrichment o
f meaning
and a continuing
development o f meaning,
such that what no longer appears is still valid as
retained and such that the prior meaning which anticipates a continuous flow,
the expectation of "what is to come," is straightway fulfilled and
more closely determined. Thus everything is taken up into the unity of
validity or into the one, the thing.
For now, this rough beginning of a description must suffice. 2.
Reading die
eben
gesehene for eben
die
gesehene. [159] § 46.
The universal a priori of correlation. AS SOON AS WE BEGIN to be on the lookout for things or objects in the
life-world, not in order to know them as what they [really] are but rather in
order to inquire into the modes of their subjective manners of givenness, i.e.,
into how an object-in our example a perceived object-exhibits itself as being
and beingsuch, we enter a realm of more and more involved and very
remarkable expositions. Ordinarily we notice nothing of the whole subjective
character of the manners of exhibiting "of" the things, but in
reflection we recognize with astonishment that essential correlations obtain
here which are the component parts of a farther-reaching, universal a priori.
And what remarkable "implications" appear, ones that can even be quite
immediately, descriptively displayed. As it was already pointed out briefly
above: I am directly conscious of the thing existing there, yet changing from
moment to moment I have the experience [Erlebnis] [of
an] "exhibiting of," although the latter, with its remarkable
"of," becomes visible only in reflection. Implied in the particular
perception of the thing is a whole "horizon" of nonactive [nichtaktuelle]
and yet cofunctioning manners of appearance
and syntheses of validity. Every first description here is of
necessity rough, and soon one is faced with the enigmas caused by this
implication of nonactive manifolds of appearances, without which no things, no
world of experience, would be given to us. And soon we are also faced with the
difficulties of concretely unfolding this a priori of correlation. The latter
can be displayed only in relativity, in an unfolding of horizons in which
one soon realizes that unnoticed limitations, horizons which have not
been felt, push us on to inquire into new correlations inseparably bound up with
those already displayed. For example, we involuntarily begin such an
"intentional analysis" of perception by giving privileged status to a
thing at rest, remaining qualitatively unchanged. But the things of the
perceptual surrounding world give themselves only temporarily in this way, and
soon the intentional problem of motion and change arises. But was such a
beginning, with the unchanged thing at rest, actually only accidental? Does the
privileged status of rest not itself have a motive in the necessary [160] course of such investigations? Or,
to look at the matter from another and very important side: involuntarily, we
began with the intentional analysis of perception (purely as perception of its
perceived object) and in fact gave privileged status thereby to intuitively
given bodies. Might this not also point to essential necessities? The
world exists as a temporal, a spatiotemporal, world in which each thing has its
bodily extension and duration and, again in respect to these, its position in
universal time and in space. It is as such that we are ever conscious of the
world in waking consciousness, as such that it is valid as universal horizon.
Perception is related only to the present.
But this present is always meant as having an endless past behind
it and an open future before it. We soon see that we need the intentional
analysis of recollection as the original manner of being conscious of the
past; but we also see that such an analysis presupposes in principle that of
perception, since memory, curiously enough, implies having-perceived. If we
consider perception abstractly, by itself, we find its intentional
accomplishment to be presentation, making something present: the object
gives itself as "there," originally there, present. But in this
presence, as that of an extended and enduring object, lies a continuity of what
I am still conscious of, what has flowed away and is no longer intuited at all,
a continuity of "retentions"-and, in the other direction, a continuity
of "protentions." Yet this is not, like memory in the usual sense of
intuitive "recollection," a phenomenon which openly, so to speak,
plays a part in object- and world-apperception. And thus the different
modes of presentification in general enter into the universal investigation we
are undertaking here, namely, that of inquiring consistently and exclusively
after the how of the world's manner of givenness, its open or implicit
"intentionalities." In displaying these, we must say to ourselves
again and again that without them the objects and the world would not be there
for us and that the former exist for us only with the meaning and the mode of
being that they receive in constantly arising or having arisen out of those
subjective accomplishments. [161] §47.
Indication of further directions of inquiry: the basic subjective
phenomena of kinesthesis, alteration of validity, horizon-consciousness, and the
communalization of experience. BUT FIRST IT WILL be necessary to continue our groping entrance into this
unknown realm of subjective phenomena and to carry out several further
expositions, which will be understandably still rough and in many respects
still imperfectly determined. Let us again give a privileged status to
perception. Previously our gaze was directed at the multiplicity of side-exhibitings
of one and the same thing and to the alteration of near and far perspectives. We
soon note that these systems of "exhibiting of" are related back
to correlative multiplicities of kinesthetic processes having the peculiar
character of the "I do," "I move" (to which even the "I
hold still" must be added). The kinestheses are different from the
movements of the living body which exhibit themselves merely as those of a
physical body, yet they are somehow one with them, belonging to one's own living
body with its two-sided character (internal kinestheses, external physical-real
movements). If we inquire into this "belonging," we notice that
in each case "my living body" requires particular and extensive
descriptions, that it has its special peculiarities in the manner of
exhibiting itself in multiplicities. Another extraordinarily important
thematic direction has not yet been named; it is characterized by the phenomenon
of the alteration of validity -- for example, the alteration of being into
illusion. In continuous perception a thing is there for me in the
straightforward ontic certainty of immediate presence - though I must add:
normally; for only when, giving my kinestheses free play, I experience
concurrent exhibitings as belonging to it is the consciousness sustained of
the one thing in actual presence, exhibiting itself in manifold fashion as
itself. But if I ask what is implied in the fact that the thing-exhibitings
belong to the altering kinestheses, I recognize that a hidden intentional
"if-then" relation is at work here: the exhibitings must occur in a
certain systematic order; it is in this way that they are indicated in advance,
in expectation, in the course of a [162] harmonious perception. The actual kinestheses here lie
within the system of kinesthetic capacity, which is correlated with the
system of possible following events harmoniously belonging to it. This is, then,
the intentional background of every straightforward ontic certainty of a
presented thing.1 Often, however, a break in this harmony occurs: being is transformed into
illusion or simply into being doubtful, being merely possible, being probable,
being after all not completely illusory, etc. The illusion is undone through
"correction," through changing the sense in which the thing had been
perceived. It is easy to see that the change of apperceptive sense takes
place through a change of the expectation-horizon of the multiplicities
anticipated as normal (i.e., as running on harmoniously). For example, one
saw a man, but then, upon touching him, had to reinterpret him as a mannequin
(exhibiting itself visually as a man). When our interest is turned in this direction, unexpectedly manifold
phenomena can be noticed in every perception, and not only in connection with
the individual thing. For consciousness the individual thing is not alone; the
perception of a thing is perception of it within a perceptual
field. And just as the individual
thing in perception has meaning only through an open horizon of "possible
perceptions," insofar as what is actually perceived "points"
to a systematic multiplicity of all possible perceptual exhibitings belonging to
it harmoniously, so the thing has yet another horizon: besides this
"internal horizon" it has an "external horizon" precisely as
a thing within a field o f things; and this points finally to the whole "world as perceptual
world." The thing is one out of the total group of simultaneously actually
perceived things; but this group is not, for us, for consciousness, the world;
rather, the world exhibits itself in it; such a group, as the momentary field of
perception, always has the character for us of a sector"”of
“ the world, of the universe of things for possible perceptions. Such,
then, at any time, is the present world; it exhibits itself to me in every case
through a nucleus of "original presence" (this designates the
continuously subjective character of what is directly perceived as such) as well
as through its internal and external horizon-validities. In
our -- or, for each of us, my2 -- waking life, the world
is 1. Cf. the similar passage on pp. 106
f., above. 2.
in
unserem, je-meinem - a very
Heideggerian turn of phrase. [163] always perceived in this way; it always flows on in the
unity of my perceptual conscious life; yet it does so in remarkable fashion,
such that, in individual details, a harmonious flow of the preindicated
multiplicities, which results in the consciousness of the straightforward
existence of the thing in question, does not always occur. Ontic certainty,
which involves an anticipatory certainty of bringing the appropriate
multiplicities harmoniously into a fulfilling flow in the course of further
perception through a voluntary direction of the kinestheses, is often not
sustained; and yet a harmony in the total perception of the world is always sustained through a correction
which actually constantly functions along with it. This includes, for
example, the correction involved in seeing something close up, whereby what was
seen from afar is determined more precisely and thus at the same time corrected
(e.g., what was an undifferentiated red at a distance shows itself from close up
to be spotted). But instead of inquiring further in the sphere of our own intuitions, let
us turn our attention to the fact that in our continuously flowing
world-perceiving we are not isolated but rather have, within it, contact with
other human beings. Each one has his perceptions, his presentifications, his
harmonious experiences, devaluation of his certainties into mere
possibilities, doubts, questions, illusions. But in lining
with one another each one can take part in the life
of the others. Thus in general the world exists not only for isolated men but
for the community of men; and this is due to the fact that even what is
straightforwardly perceptual is communalized. In this communalization, too, there constantly occurs an alteration of
validity through reciprocal correction. In reciprocal understanding, my
experiences and experiential acquisitions enter into contact with those of
others, similar to the contact between individual series of experiences within
my (one's own) experiential life; and here again, for the most part, intersubjective
harmony of validity occurs, [establishing what is] "normal" in respect
to particular details, and thus an intersubjective unity also comes about in the
multiplicity of validities and of what is valid through them; here again,
furthermore, intersubjective discrepancies show themselves often enough; but
then, whether it is unspoken and even unnoticed, or is expressed through
discussion and criticism, a unification is brought about or at least is certain
in advance as possibly attainable by everyone. All this takes place in such a
way that in the consciousness of each [164] individual, and in the overarching community
consciousness which has grown up through [social] contact, one and the same
world achieves and continuously maintains constant validity as the world which
is in part already experienced and in part the open horizon of possible
experiences for all; it is the world as the universal horizon, common to all
men, of actually existing things. Each individual, as a subject of possible
experiences, has his experiences, his aspects, his perceptual interconnections,
his alteration of validity, his corrections, etc.; and each particular social
group has its communal aspects, etc. Here again, properly speaking, each
individual has his experienced things, that is, if we understand by this what in
particular is valid for him, what is seen by him and, through the seeing, is
experienced as straightforwardly existing and being-such. But each
individual "knows" himself to be living within the horizon of his
fellow human beings, with whom he can enter into sometimes actual, sometimes
potential contact, as they also can do (as he likewise knows) in actual and
potential living together. He knows that he and his fellows, in their actual
contact, are related to the same experienced things in such a way that each
individual has different aspects, different sides, perspectives, etc., of
them but that in each case these are taken from the same total system of multiplicities
of which each individual is constantly conscious (in the actual experience of
the same thing) as the horizon of possible experience of this thing. If one
attends to the distinction between things as "originally one's
own" and as "empathized" from others, in respect to the how of
the manners of appearance, and if one attends to the possibility of
discrepancies between one's own and empathized views, then what one actually
experiences originaliter as a perceptual thing is transformed, for each of us, into a mere
"representation of" ["Vorstellung
von"], "appearance of," the one objectively existing thing. From
the synthesis these have taken on precisely the new sense "appearance
of," and as such they are henceforth valid. "The" thing itself is
actually that which no one experiences as really seen, since it is always in
motion, always, and for everyone, a unity for consciousness of the openly
endless multiplicity of changing experiences and experienced things, one's
own and those of others. The cosubjects of this experience themselves make up,
for me and for one another, an openly endless horizon of human beings who are
capable of meeting and then entering into actual contact with me and with
one another. [165] §48. Anything
that is-whatever its meaning and to whatever region it belongs-is an index of a
subjective system of correlations. IN THIS EXCLUSIVE concentration on the multiplicities of subjective
manners of appearing through which the world is pregiven to us, we arrive, again
and again-even though we have really considered only the world of perception,
indeed only its corporeal features-at the insight that we are not dealing merely
with contingent matters of fact. Rather, no conceivable human being, no matter
how different we imagine him to be, could ever experience a world in manners of
givenness which differ from the incessantly mobile relativity we have delineated
in general terms, i.e., as a world pregiven to him in his conscious life and in
community with fellow human beings. The fact which is naively taken for granted,
that each person sees things and the world in general as they appear to him,
concealed, as we now realize, a great horizon of remarkable truths whose uniqueness
and systematic interconnection never entered the philosophical purview. The
correlation between world (the world of which we always speak) and its
subjective manners of givenness never evoked philosophical wonder (that is,
prior to the first breakthrough of "transcendental phenomenology" in
the Logical Investigations), in
spite of the fact that it had made itself felt even in pre-Socratic philosophy
and among the Sophists - though here only as a motive for skeptical
argumentation. This correlation never aroused a philosophical interest of its
own which could have made it the object of an appropriate scientific attitude.
Philosophers were confined by what was taken for granted, i.e., that each thing
appeared differently in each case to each person. But as soon as we begin to examine
carefully the how of the appearance of a thing in its actual and possible alteration and to
pay consistent attention to the correlation it involves between appearance and that which appears as such, and if we consider the alteration as an alteration of
validity for the intentionality occurring in the ego-subjects and their
communalization, we are [166] forced to recognize a fixed typology with ever widening
ramifications. It applies not only to perceiving, to bodies, and to the
penetrable depths of immediate sensibility but to any and every entity within
the spatiotemporal world and to its subjective manners of givenness.
Everything thus stands in correlation with its own manners of givenness, which
are by no means merely sensible in character, within a possible experience;
and everything has its modes of validity and its particular manners of
synthesis. Experience, self-evidence, is not an empty generality but is
differentiated according to the species, genera, and regional categories of
what is and also according to all spatiotemporal modalities. Whatever
exists, whether it has a concrete or abstract, real or ideal, meaning, has its
manners of self-givenness and, on the side of the ego, its manners of intention
in modes of validity; to this belong the manners of the subjective variation of
these modes in syntheses of individual-subjective and intersubjective harmony
and discrepancy. We also foresee (as even the first trials made clear in a
preliminary way) that this confusingly manifold typology of correlations,
comprising further differentiations at every turn, is not a mere though
generally established fact but rather that the factual indicates an essential
necessity which, with the proper method, can be translated into essential
generalities, into an immense system of novel and highly astounding a
priori truths. No matter where we turn, every entity that is valid for me and
every conceivable subject as existing in actuality is thus correlatively-and
with essential necessity-an index of its systematic multiplicities. Each one
indicates an ideal general set of actual and possible experiential manners of
givenness, each of which is an appearance of this one entity, such that
every actual concrete experience brings about, from this total multiplicity, a
harmonious flow of manners of givenness which continuously fulfills the
experiencing intention. *
The first breakthrough of this universal a priori of correlation between
experienced object and manners of givenness (which occurred during work on
my Logical
Investigations around 1898) affected me so deeply that my whole
subsequent life-work has been dominated by the task of systematically
elaborating on this a priori of correlation. The further course of the
reflections in this text will show how, when human subjectivity was brought into
the problems of correlation, a radical transformation of the meaning of these
problems became necessary which finally led to the phenomenological reduction to
absolute, transcendental subjectivity. The
first, though still unclarified, emergence of the phenomenological
reduction occurred several years after the publication of the Logical
Investigations (1900-1901); the first attempt at a systematic introduction to the
new philosophy of the transcendental reduction appeared in 1913 as a fragment
(Volume I of Ideas toward a Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy). Contemporary
philosophy of the decades since then-- even that of the so-called phenomenological
schools -- preferred to persist in the old philosophical naïveté. To be sure, the
first breakthroughs of such a radical change, a total transformation of the
whole natural manner of life, were difficult to present adequately, especially
since certain considerations, which will become understandable in the following,
constantly give rise to misinterpretations resulting from relapses into the
natural attitude. [167] The total multiplicity of manners
of givenness, however, is a horizon of possibly realizable processes, as opposed
to the actual process, and as such it belongs to each experience, or rather to
the intention which is operative within it. For each subject this intention is
the cogito; the manners of givenness (understood in the widest sense) make up
its cogitatum according to the "what" and the "how," and the
manners of givenness in turn bring to "exhibition" the one and the
same entity which is their unity. § 49. Preliminary
concept of transcendental constitution as "original formation of
meaning." The restricted character of the exemplary analyses carried out so
far; an indication of further horizons of exposition. WE SEE HOW FAR we must take all this when we realize that, while we are dealing with the
total intentional accomplishment, having many levels, of the subjectivity
in question, it is not that of the isolated subject. We are dealing, rather,
with the entire intersubjectivity which is brought together in the accomplishment-and
here the concepts of "what is," of "manners of givenness,"
of "syntheses," etc., are repeatedly relativized. Again and again we
realize that, beginning with the superficially visible, the manners of
appearing belonging to the unifying multiplicities are themselves unities
of multiplicities which lie deeper and which constitute them through
appearances, so that we are led back to an obscure horizon-which, however, can
still be [168] opened up through methodical
regressive inquiry. All the levels and strata through which the syntheses,
intentionally overlapping as they are from subject to subject, are
interwoven form a universal unity of synthesis; through it the objective
universe comes to be -- the world which is and as it is concretely and vividly
given (and pregiven for all possible praxis). In this regard we speak of the
"intersubjective constitution" of the world, meaning by this the total
system of manners of givenness, however hidden, and also of modes of
validity for egos; through this constitution, if we systematically uncover it,
the world as it is for us becomes understandable as a structure of meaning
formed out of elementary intentionalities. The being of these intentionalities
themselves is nothing but one meaningformation operating together with
another, "constituting" new meaning through synthesis. And meaning is
never anything but meaning in modes of validity, that is, as related to
intending ego-subjects which effect validity. Intentionality is the title which
stands for the only actual and genuine way of explaining, making intelligible.
To go back to the intentional origins and unities of the formation of meaning is
to proceed toward a comprehension which, once achieved (which is of course an
ideal case), would leave no meaningful question unanswered. But every serious
and genuine move from a "ready-made entity" back to its intentional
origins gives us, in respect to those strata already uncovered and the
clarification of what is accomplished in them, an understanding which, though
merely relative, is yet an actual understanding as far as it goes. What we dealt with in the manner of examples was naturally only a
beginning, in fact a beginning of the clarification of merely the world of
perception, which is itself, taken as a whole, only a "stratum." The
world is a spatiotemporal world; spatiotemporality (as "living,"
not as logicomathematical) belongs to its own ontic meaning as life-world. Our
focus on the world of perception (and it is no accident that we begin here)
gives us, as far as the world is concerned, only the temporal mode of the
present; this mode itself points to its horizons, the temporal modes of past and
future. Recollection, above all, exercises the intentional function of forming
the meaning of the past -- apart from the fact that perception itself, as the
"flowing-static" present, is constituted only through the fact
that the static "now" (as a deeper intentional analysis shows) has a
horizon with two differently structured sides, known in intentional language as
a continuum of retentions and protentions. These first prefigurations [169] of temporalization and time,
however, remain in the background. In the recollection founded upon them we
have before us, in original intuition, a past -- a present which has passed. It too
has "being": it has its multiplicities of manners of givenness, its
manners of coming to original self-givenness (to immediate self-evidence) as
what has passed. Likewise, in expectation or anticipatory recollection, again
understood as an intentional modification of perception (the future is a
present-to-come), is found the meaning-formation from which arises the ontic
meaning of that which is in the future. And the deeper structure of this
can be revealed in more detail. This represents the beginnings of new
dimensions of temporalization, or of time and its time content -- quite apart from
the fact (which is not to be elucidated here) that the constitution of every
level and sort of entity is a temporalization which gives to each distinctive
meaning of an entity in the constitutive system its own temporal form,
whereas only through the all-inclusive, universal synthesis which constitutes
the world do all these times come together synthetically into the unity of one
time. One thing more should be pointed out : in the elucidation of the
accomplishment of the intentional syntheses, privileged status is given to the
clarification of the syntheses of continuity (for example, the one contained
in the flowing unity of perception); these serve as a ground for elucidating on
a higher level the discrete syntheses. I give as an example [of the latter] the
identification of something perceived as the same thing that, according to
recollection, was there before. This rerecognition, its exposition through the
continuity of recollection, the corresponding deeper analyses of these
"obvious" matters -- all this leads to difficult investigations. Here, as everywhere, we can investigate first only what is nearest to our
comprehension. But it should be clear from the preceding that as soon as one has
progressed far enough in the reorientation of the epoche to see the purely
subjective in its own self-enclosed pure context as intentionality and to
recognize it as the function of forming ontic meaning, the theoretical interest
grows quickly, and one becomes more astonished at each step by the endless array
of emerging problems and important discoveries to be made. To be sure, one
is soon beset by extraordinary difficulties: that of preserving the pure frame
of mind, of finding one's way in an unknown world, where all the concepts, all
the ways of thinking and scientific methods based on the natural world, as well
as all the logical methods of objective
science, are of no help; and that of bringing about a novel and yet scientific [170] way of thinking through the required method which is developing in a precursory way. In truth, this is a whole world-and if we could equate this subjectivity with the |