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[勞思光] [許國宏] [呂健吉] [郭朝順] [黃冠閔] [伍至學] [龔維正] [陳振崑] [冀劍制] |
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黃冠閔之哲學教學網
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DISCOURSE
ON THE METHOD OF RIGHTLY CONDUCTING THE REASON, AND SEEKING TRUTH IN THE
SCIENCES
(1637) Rene
Descartes translated
by John Veitch, LL.D. Electronically
Enhanced Text (c) Copyright 1993 World Library, Inc. Descartes,
Rene (1596-1650) - French philosopher and scientist regarded as the father of
modern rationalism. Also noted as a mathematician, he is said to be the
originator of modern scientific method and analytic geometry. Discourse on the
Method (1637) - A six-part study on various scientific matters leading to the
expression of Descartes primary philosophical principle, I think, therefore I
am.? CHAPTER
II
I WAS then in Germany, attracted thither by the wars in that country,
which have not yet been brought to a termination; and as I was returning to the
army from the coronation of the emperor, the setting in of winter arrested me in
a locality where, as I found no society to interest me, and was besides
fortunately undisturbed by any cares or passions, I remained the whole day in
seclusion[1],
with full opportunity to occupy my attention with my own thoughts. Of these one
of the very first that occurred to me was, that there is seldom so much
perfection in works composed of many separate parts, upon which different hands
had been employed, as in those completed by a single master. Thus it is
observable that the buildings which a single architect has planned and executed,
are generally more elegant and commodious than those which several have
attempted to improve, by making old walls serve for purposes for which they were
not originally built. Thus
also, those ancient cities which, from being at first only villages, have
become, in course of time, large towns, are usually but ill laid out compared
with the regularly constructed towns which a professional architect has freely
planned on an open plain; so that although the several buildings of the former
may often equal or surpass in beauty those of the latter, yet when one observes
their indiscriminate juxtaposition, there a large one and here a small, and the
consequent crookedness and irregularity of the streets, one is disposed to
allege that chance rather than any human will guided by reason must have led to
such an arrangement. And if we consider that nevertheless there have been at all
times certain officers whose duty it was to see that private buildings
contributed to public ornament, the difficulty of reaching high perfection with
but the materials of others to operate on, will be readily acknowledged. In the
same way I fancied that those nations which, starting from a semi-barbarous
state and advancing to civilisation by slow degrees, have had their laws
successively determined, and, as it were, forced upon them simply by experience
of the hurtfulness of particular crimes and disputes, would by this process come
to be possessed of less perfect institutions than those which, from the
commencement of their association as communities, have followed the appointments
of some wise legislator. It is thus quite certain that the constitution of the
true religion, the ordinances of which are derived from God, must be
incomparably superior to that of every other. And, to speak of human affairs, I
believe that the past pre-eminence of Sparta was due not to the goodness of each
of its laws in particular, for many of these were very strange, and even opposed
to good morals, but to the circumstance that, originated by a single individual,
they all tended to a single end. In the same way I thought that the sciences
contained in books (such of them at least as are made up of probable reasonings,
without demonstrations), composed as they are of the opinions of many different
individuals massed together, are farther removed from truth than the simple
inferences which a man of good sense using his natural and unprejudiced judgment
draws respecting the matters of his experience. And because we have all to pass
through a state of infancy to manhood, and have been of necessity, for a length
of time, governed by our desires and preceptors (whose dictates were frequently
conflicting, while neither perhaps always counselled us for the best), I farther
concluded that it is almost impossible that our judgments can be so correct or
solid as they would have been, had our reason been mature from the moment of our
birth, and had we always been guided by it alone.
It is true, however, that it is not customary to pull down all the houses
of a town with the single design of rebuilding them differently, and thereby
rendering the streets more handsome; but it often happens that a private
individual takes down his own with the view of erecting it anew, and that people
are even sometimes constrained to this when their houses are in danger of
falling from age, or when the foundations are insecure. With this before me by
way of example, I was persuaded that it would indeed be preposterous for a
private individual to think of reforming a state by fundamentally changing it
throughout, and overturning it in order to set it up amended; and the same I
thought was true of any similar project for reforming the body of the sciences,
or the order of teaching them established in the schools: but as for the
opinions which up to that time I had embraced, I thought that I could not do
better than resolve at once to sweep them wholly away, that I might afterwards
be in a position to admit either others more correct, or even perhaps the same
when they had undergone the scrutiny of reason. I firmly believed that in this
way I should much better succeed in the conduct of my life, than if I built only
upon old foundations, and leant upon principles which, in my youth, I had taken
upon trust. For although I recognised various difficulties in this undertaking,
these were not, however, without remedy, nor once to be compared with such as
attend the slightest reformation in public affairs. Large
bodies, if once overthrown, are with great difficulty set up again, or even kept
erect when once seriously shaken, and the fall of such is always disastrous. Then
if there are any imperfections in the constitutions of states (and that many
such exist the diversity of constitutions is alone sufficient to assure us),
custom has without doubt materially smoothed their inconveniences, and has even
managed to steer altogether clear of, or insensibly corrected a number which
sagacity could not have provided against with equal effect; and, in fine, the
defects are almost always more tolerable than the change necessary for their
removal; in the same manner that highways which wind among mountains, by being
much frequented, become gradually so smooth and commodious, that it is much
better to follow them than to seek a straighter path by climbing over the tops
of rocks and descending to the bottoms of precipices.
Hence it is that I cannot in any degree approve of those restless and
busy meddlers who, called neither by birth nor fortune to take part in the
management of public affairs, are yet always projecting reforms; and if I
thought that this tract contained aught which might justify the suspicion that I
was a victim of such folly, I would by no means permit its publication. I have
never contemplated anything higher than the reformation of my own opinions, and
basing them on a foundation wholly my own. And although my own satisfaction with
my work has led me to present here a draft of it, I do not by any means
therefore recommend to every one else to make a similar attempt. Those whom God
has endowed with a larger measure of genius will entertain, perhaps, designs
still more exalted; but for the many I am much afraid lest even the present
undertaking be more than they can safely venture to imitate. The single design
to strip one’s self of all past beliefs is one that ought not to be taken by
every one. The majority of men is composed of two classes, for neither of which
would this be at all a befitting resolution: in the first place, of those who
with more than a due confidence in their own powers, are precipitate in their
judgments and want the patience requisite for orderly and circumspect thinking;
whence it happens, that if men of this class once take the liberty to doubt of
their accustomed opinions, and quit the beaten highway, they will never be able
to thread the byway that would lead them by a shorter course, and will lose
themselves and continue to wander for life; in the second place, of those who,
possessed of sufficient sense or modesty to determine that there are others who
excel them in the power of discriminating between truth and error, and by whom
they may be instructed, ought rather to content themselves with the opinions of
such than trust for more correct to their own reason.
For my own part, I should doubtless have belonged to the latter class,
had I received instruction from but one master, or had I never known the
diversities of opinion that from time immemorial have prevailed among men of the
greatest learning. But I had become aware, even so early as during my college
life, that no opinion, however absurd and incredible, can be imagined, which has
not been maintained by some one of the philosophers; and afterwards in the
course of my travels I remarked that all those whose opinions are decidedly
repugnant to ours are not on that account barbarians and savages, but on the
contrary that many of these nations make an equally good, if not a better, use
of their reason than we do.
I took into account also the very different character which a person
brought up from infancy in France or Germany exhibits, from that which, with the
same mind originally, this individual would have possessed had he lived always
among the Chinese or with savages, and the circumstance that in dress itself the
fashion which pleased us ten years ago, and which may again, perhaps, be
received into favour before ten years have gone, appears to us at this moment
extravagant and ridiculous. I was thus led to infer that the ground of our
opinions is far more custom and example than any certain knowledge. And,
finally, although such be the ground of our opinions, I remarked that a
plurality of suffrages is no guarantee of truth where it is at all of difficult
discovery, as in such cases it is much more likely that it will be found by one
than by many. I could, however, select from the crowd no one whose opinions
seemed worthy of preference, and thus I found myself constrained, as it were, to
use my own reason in the conduct of my life. But
like one walking alone and in the dark, I resolved to proceed so slowly and with
such circumspection, that if I did not advance far, I would at least guard
against falling. I did not even choose to dismiss summarily any of the opinions
that had crept into my belief without having been introduced by reason, but
first of all took sufficient time carefully to satisfy myself of the general
nature of the task I was setting myself, and ascertain the true method by which
to arrive at the knowledge of whatever lay within the compass of my powers.
Among the branches of philosophy, I had, at an earlier period, given some
attention to logic, and among those of the mathematics to geometrical analysis
and algebra,- three arts or sciences which ought, as I conceived, to contribute
something to my design. But, on examination, I found that, as for logic, its
syllogisms and the majority of its other precepts are of avail rather in the
communication of what we already know, or even as the art of Lully, in speaking
without judgment of things of which we are ignorant, than in the investigation
of the unknown; and although this science contains indeed a number of correct
and very excellent precepts, there are, nevertheless, so many others, and these
either injurious or superfluous, mingled with the former, that it is almost
quite as difficult to effect a severance of the true from the false as it is to
extract a Diana or a Minerva from a rough block of marble. Then as to the
analysis of the ancients and the algebra of the moderns, besides that they
embrace only matters highly abstract, and, to appearance, of no use, the former
is so exclusively restricted to the consideration of figures, that it can
exercise the understanding only on condition of greatly fatiguing the
imagination; and, in the latter, there is so complete a subjection to certain
rules and formulas, that there results an art full of confusion and obscurity
calculated to embarrass, instead of a science fitted to cultivate the mind. By
these considerations I was induced to seek some other method which would
comprise the advantages of the three and be exempt from their defects. And as a
multitude of laws often only hampers justice, so that a state is best governed
when, with few laws, these are rigidly administered; in like manner, instead of
the great number of precepts of which logic is composed, I believed that the
four following would prove perfectly sufficient for me, provided I took the firm
and unwavering resolution never in a single instance to fail in observing them.
The first was never to accept anything for true which I did not clearly
know to be such; that is to say, carefully to avoid precipitancy and prejudice,
and to comprise nothing more in my judgment than what was presented to my mind
so clearly and distinctly as to exclude all ground of doubt.
The second, to divide each of the difficulties under examination into as
many parts as possible, and as might be necessary for its adequate solution.
The third, to conduct my thoughts in such order that, by commencing with
objects the simplest and easiest to know, I might ascend by little and little,
and, as it were, step by step, to the knowledge of the more complex; assigning
in thought a certain order even to those objects which in their own nature do
not stand in a relation of antecedence and sequence.
And the last, in every case to make enumerations so complete, and reviews
so general, that I might be assured that nothing was omitted.
The long chains of simple and easy reasonings by means of which geometers
are accustomed to reach the conclusions of their most difficult demonstrations,
had led me to imagine that all things, to the knowledge of which man is
competent, are mutually connected in the same way, and that there is nothing so
far removed from us as to be beyond our reach, or so hidden that we cannot
discover it, provided only we abstain from accepting the false for the true, and
always preserve in our thoughts the order necessary for the deduction of one
truth from another. And I had little difficulty in determining the objects with
which it was necessary to commence, for I was already persuaded that it must be
with the simplest and easiest to know, and, considering that of all those who
have hitherto sought truth in the sciences, the mathematicians alone have been
able to find any demonstrations, that is, any certain and evident reasons, I did
not doubt but that such must have been the rule of their investigations. I
resolved to commence, therefore, with the examination of the simplest objects,
not anticipating, however, from this any other advantage than that to be found
in accustoming my mind to the love and nourishment of truth, and to a distaste
for all such reasonings as were unsound. But I had no intention on that account
of attempting to master all the particular sciences commonly denominated
mathematics: but observing that, however different their objects, they all agree
in considering only the various relations or proportions subsisting among those
objects, I thought it best for my purpose to consider these proportions in the
most general form possible, without referring them to any objects in particular,
except such as would most facilitate the knowledge of them, and without by any
means restricting them to these, that afterwards I might thus be the better able
to apply them to every other class of objects to which they are legitimately
applicable. Perceiving further, that in order to understand these relations I
should sometimes have to consider them one by one, and sometimes only to bear
them in mind, or embrace them in the aggregate, I thought that, in order the
better to consider them individually, I should view them as subsisting between
straight lines, than which I could find no objects more simple, or capable of
being more distinctly represented to my imagination and senses; and on the other
hand, that in order to retain them in the memory, or embrace an aggregate of
many, I should express them by certain characters the briefest possible. In this
way I believed that I could borrow all that was best both in geometrical
analysis and in algebra, and correct all the defects of the one by help of the
other.
And, in point of fact, the accurate observance of these few precepts gave
me, I take the liberty of saying, such ease in unravelling all the questions
embraced in these two sciences, that in the two or three months I devoted to
their examination, not only did I reach solutions of questions I had formerly
deemed exceedingly difficult, but even as regards questions of the solution of
which I continued ignorant, I was enabled, as it appeared to me, to determine
the means whereby, and the extent to which, a solution was possible; results
attributable to the circumstance that I commenced with the simplest and most
general truths, and that thus each truth discovered was a rule available in the
discovery of subsequent ones. Nor in this perhaps shall I appear too vain, if it
be considered that, as the truth on any particular point is one, whoever
apprehends the truth, knows all that on that point can be known. The child, for
example, who has been instructed in the elements of arithmetic, and has made a
particular addition, according to rule, may be assured that he has found, with
respect to the sum of the numbers before him, all that in this instance is
within the reach of human genius. Now, in conclusion, the method which teaches
adherence to the true order, and an exact enumeration of all the conditions of
the thing sought includes all that gives certitude to the rules of arithmetic. But the chief ground of my satisfaction with this method, was the assurance I had of thereby exercising my reason in all matters, if not with absolute perfection, at least with the greatest attainable by me: besides, I was conscious that by its use my mind was becoming gradually habituated to clearer and more distinct conceptions of its objects; and I hoped also, from not having restricted this method to any particular matter, to apply it to the difficulties of the other sciences, with not less success than to those of algebra. I should not, however, on this account have ventured at once on the examination of all the difficulties of the sciences which presented themselves to me, for this would have been contrary to the order prescribed in the method, but observing that the knowledge of such is dependent on principles borrowed from philosophy, in which I found nothing certain, I thought it necessary first of all to endeavour to establish its principles. And because I observed, besides, that an inquiry of this kind was of all others of the greatest moment, and one in which precipitancy and anticipation in judgment were most to be dreaded, I thought that I ought not to approach it till I had reached a more mature age (being at that time but twenty-three), and had first of all employed much of my time in preparation for the work, as well by eradicating from my mind all the erroneous opinions I had up to that moment accepted, as by amassing variety of experience to afford materials for my reasonings, and by continually exercising myself in my chosen method with a view to increased skill in its application. |