A world otherwise

-- A sketch about the relation between metaphysics and the world

Our main issue ¡§Philosophy, methodology and our world¡¨ exposes a real concern of today¡¦s philosophers, which comprehends in itself a complexity of problems. The implied problems do not mean something lacked in the original title of our meeting, but perhaps offer an opportunity to release the doubts, the anxieties and the hopes about the tension between philosophical researches and the actuality in the world. What fascinates me at first sight is the term ¡§our world¡¨ which contains a world (or maybe more worlds!), a ¡§we¡¨ and a possessive relationship ¡§our¡¨ (the genitive case). The second term ¡V methodology ¡V leads me to doubt rather than to assign a task to myself: are method and the doctrine of methods (methodology means the discourse of method, about methods, or even by method, by methods) necessary for philosophy, for the philosophical task in ¡§our world¡¨? My concern in these issues forces me to ask myself if and how the world-character meets the philosophy and its method. To reply to these questions might have several different ways, such as the social and political philosophy, ethics, bioethics, ecology, psychology, or cosmology in the older sense. Those approaches, however justified, show a direct concern of the discussion subject and the real world (psychic, physical, social world etc.). But my problematic comes from an apparently less justified approach to the exposed questions ¡V the metaphysical approach.

I would like to call my approach an metaphysical approach, or better, an approach of metaphysics. My first reason to choose this approach is that metaphysics suffers from the attack for its decline and its non-realistic character, i.e. its non-worldness. In a word, metaphysics is said to be out of date, impertinent to the world. But my second reason is also in regard to the resistance (if there exists) of metaphysics, which tries to revitalize its activities in the very core of contemporary philosophy.

The tension of metaphysics with the world resides upon the usual reception of the name meta-physics (met¦ t¦ fusik£), particularly upon the sense of the suffix meta as surpassing or transcending, therefore the meaning of metaphysics is often interpreted as a science behind/beyond physics. After the Kantian criticism of metaphysics, Schelling asserted in an uncompleted dialogue written around 1809-1811, Clara, that the tension appears rather between the natural world and the spiritual world. We find a text stating the task of metaphysics:

¡§Die alte Metaphysik erklärte sich durch ihren Namen als Wissenschaft, die nach, also gewissermaßen auch aus der Erkenntniß der Natur folgte, eine gesteigerte Fortsetzung derselben war; sie nahm daher auch die Erkenntniß, deren sie sich außer der Physik rühmte, in einem gewissen tüchtigen, gediegenen Sinn, mit welchem allein dem Erkenntnißlustigen gedient seyn kann. Die neuere Philosophie hob ihren unmittelbaren Bezug mit der Natur auf, oder wußte ihn nicht zu behaupten, und verschmähte stolz jeden Zusammenhang mit Physik; die Ansprüche auf eine höhere Welt fortsetzend, war sie nicht mehr Metaphysik, sondern Hyperphysik.¡§[1] (Translation: ¡§The old metaphysics explains itself by its name as a science which, also departing from the knowledge of nature, was aiming at an ascending process of this knowledge; it then take also this knowledge in regard to which it put itself out of physics, and in a certain sharp, deep sense with which only the pleasure of knowledge can be served. The newest philosophy suppressed its immediate relation with the nature, or did not have the sense to affirm this relation, and it weakened every connection with physics; the demand of putting forward a higher world was no more metaphysics, but rather hyperphysics.¡¨)

In Schelling¡¦s argumentation, the existence of the world is primarily presupposed; furthermore the coexistence of nature and spiritual world is asserted. The ignorance of the nature in science is accused as hyper-physics, accused of leaving no basis for the promotion of science in the spiritual world. We can take this conception as a step to reflect on the world-character of metaphysics. What Schelling confronted is perhaps a Kant, a Fichte or a Jacobi, however the mere intensification of the importance of spiritual world is not sufficient for seizing the total reality. We can understand, with Schelling, that the Kantian critique of metaphysics deprives the ethics of its cosmological character[2], since the reason (especially practical reason) is at home by giving itself the imperatives without referring to the sense of cosmos. If we go further in the direction of the argumentation, whether the connection or separation in those two worlds is more correct is no longer a problem falsifiable, but a hint leading to the key character of the concept ¡¥world¡¦ in the science of metaphysics. For short, world would not be only one (the monist tradition, such as Parmenides), but two, such as in the example for Kant (phenomenal world / intelligible world) and for Schelling (Nature and world of spirits), and maybe more (Leibniz, for example) ¡V but the plurality of world forms another question that we shall consider somewhere else; meanwhile, how the concept of world is necessary for the philosophical undertaking demands more concerns.

A methodological coincidence appearing in the relation between phenomenology and metaphysics deserves our sight to deepen our reflections. The question of world has a key-point in this issue. For Heidegger, the analysis of Dasein begins from its world-character, the Being-in-the-world (In-der-Welt-Sein), which allows Heidegger to precede the plan of fundamental ontology for surpassing traditional metaphysics. Another phenomenologist, Fink, asks for a more radical gesture by elaborating the concept of world to the core of phenomenology. We know also that Husserl, having discussed his methodology with the assistance of Fink, submits a radical change in his later philosophy focusing on the pregivenness of the world, by using the term life-world (Lebenswelt)¡Xin fact, some recent researches focus on the discovering of the world implied in the early works of Husserl[3]. Basically, the concept of world, taken methodologically, is related to reduction and epoche, which constitutes the first steps in phenomenology. Being marked by a difference with the attitude of ¡§natural world¡¨, the phenomenological conscience does not exclude the world phenomena, but extends the possibility of their appearance; the ¡§world¡¦ is given as horizon ¡V Welthorizont[4]. The horizon of world is the (transcendental) basis of revealing phenomenon-structure of things. The importance of ¡§world¡¨ shows itself in Husserl as the transcendental constitution of intersubjectivity, in Heidegger as the start point of fundamental ontology, in Fink as the turning point from ontology to cosmology. But a further investigation is necessitated to allow us to catch the detailed development on this orientation, which constitutes one of my next-step research subjects. We can take some notes about this phenomenological orientation contributing to the world-problem. First of all, the ¡§world¡¨ is taken as a question in itself, whether as the non-reductive base of all phenomena (non-reductive to an idea) by making possible the appearance of existence, or as a clue to the revelation of the givenness of Being. As Fink puts it, around the ¡§world¡¨,

¡§it is not a matter of discovering something marginal and novel, of enlightening something covered. The world is here and everywhere, it is never absolutely unknown for us. It is the manifest, one which is the most evident.¡¨[5]

And our question is just how to qualify the world as a ¡§phenomenon¡¨ and how to determine the evidence of this phenomenon. Secondly, the old metaphysical presupposition taken by Kant and Schelling, i.e. the split between Nature and Spirit, is critically redefined by Husserl and has met the doubt of Merleau-Ponty :

¡§ but maybe it¡¦s not according to the bifurcation of the Nature and the Spirit that we have to think the world and ourselves¡¨[6].

Merleau-Ponty proposes a research bypassing the old dualism and asks questions on the third dimension, i.e. their union[7], or better; their common base. So, world itself becomes a question to be observed and resolved in the methodological dimension. Consequently and thirdly, the conceptual operation of the world, such as the phenomenological method mentioned here, implies a double possibility: methodological and ontological at the same time. The effort to make sense of the world (world-phenomenon) leads to deepen the methodological reflection. The comment of Jean Beaufret indicates the foundation of existence in Being-in-the-world[8], and its non-metaphysical meaning. Meanwhile E. Fink is conscious of the need to confront the metaphysical tradition in figuring out the real world-foundation[9]. The ontological status of world, which is put in brackets in the phenomenology, can offer us another start-point of reflection by following the Fink¡¦s problematic orientation. If the phenomenology itself becomes a good example and a legacy for the methodological examination, why not start from the necessity of the confrontation of the phenomenological approach with the metaphysical approach?

Inspired by the phenomenological definition of ¡§world¡¨ as ¡§in which we are¡¨[10], Rémi Brague works out an examination of the concept of world in the history of philosophy. He gives us a kind of confrontation of two approaches mentioned here. According to R. Brague, the world, treated as the foundation of appearance or the ground to be abandoned, can get its resources in the ancient models of considering the world. These four models are the following: 1) the platonic vision, especially the cosmos (kÒsmoj) in Timaeus, 2) the atomic vision, or the Epicurean cosmology, 3) the biblical vision, or the abrahamical tradition (Christian, Hebrew, Islam), 4) the Gnostic vision[11]. The basic lines of Brague¡¦s work stand for the observation of the relation between anthropology (including ethics, politics, religion etc.) and cosmology (differing from cosmography and cosmogony); accordingly, the world order is tightly connected to the human actions, whatever imaginary or institutional. The four classical models point out the situation of world in the thinking of ancient world. The Platonic vision (or platonico-aristotelean, for its influence in the Middle Ages) takes the cosmos as the perfect model for the imitation of human actions, since cosmos signifies order, beauty. The atomic vision separates the physical world from the human world by considering the absolute indifference between these two, so that, radically speaking, the cosmos has nothing to do with the human (anthropos). As for the biblical vision that suppose the divine creation, the world as created by God is good and perfect according to the perfect will of holy Creator; it has thus a perfection just in a secondary order in regard to the real superior dominator and depends on Him. So the world as second order perfection can not serve as a model of imitation of human actions. On the contrary, the Gnostic vision considers the world as totally corrupted by presupposing the historical salvation and sees in the world the original sin, so the world is taken for the fallen world and corresponds to the History; in short, this world is on the side of human and thus needs to be saved as human being. The analyses of Brague give us some hints about a further consideration on the relation of metaphysics and world, for the four models form something like archetypes which allow the encasement of the metaphysical alternatives in respect to the world. Even Brague concludes that the world in the old sense is ¡¥lost¡¦[12] in the labyrinth of modernity, the question of the world-reference remains valid as far as the sense of actuality recalls this necessity of world, just as our colloquium title shows it.

We can indicate here some aspects inspired by the preparative considerations given above. Firstly, the world itself forces us to regard, to recall its phenomenality, its horizonality, its necessity of appearing, at least appearing in some way. Secondarily, this ¡¥some way¡¦ forms itself a further question, for the problem of transcendence and immanence of world has effects on all metaphysical systems. It is interesting to see the different dimensions of the formation of world in the historical context. Taking the later Schelling for example, he commanded a critique of reason on the immanent and transcendent sides: the Mythology is the immanent side shown in the developpement of reason and the Revelation as the transcendence of reason. So in the metaphysical context, the concept of world is never neutral in so far as the phenomenological approach demands a suspension of (metaphysical or ontological) value in the reduction of essence. Thirdly, on the methodological level, the ¡¥world¡¦ reveals in itself an impossibility of total self-evidence by reason that world is the ¡§pregiven¡¨ reference-point. A reflection on the ideal of self-evidence can draw some clues from the worldliness and the world-fact (facticity of world). Both the anatomy of the concept of world in the history and of the attitudes regarding to the world are opened for our future work. World as appearance intrudes in the dimension of presence by introducing the temporality such in term of ¡¥present world¡¦, ¡¥actual world¡¦ etc.; we are also forced to rethink the case of virtual presence and the hybrid form of the world (combined with subjectivity, historicity). Around the world, all the recurring acts such like reflection, reminiscence, recalling, can not lead to the naïve and direct affirmation of the world and of its existence; on the contrary, the ¡¥existence¡¦ of world, or for short, the world introduces an otherness on the philosophical thinking by giving tremendous dimensional richness.

Bibliography

Kostas Axelos, Le jeu du monde, Paris, Minuit, 1969

--, Héraclite e la philosophie, Paris, Minuit, 1962, « le cosmos- le feu », pp.91-162 ; « Dieu, le logos, le cosmos, le feu », pp.123-127.

Antoine Faivre, Philosophie de la nature, 1996, Paris, Albin Michel, « âme du monde et divine Sophia chez Franz von Baader », pp.76-90

Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, Tübingen, Max Niemayer, 1986¹⁶ (1927), ¡±11, ¡±14 (Die Idee der Weltlichkeit der Welt überhaupt), ¡±¡±15-18 (Die Analyse der Umweltlichkeit und Weltlichkeit ïberhaupt), ¡±¡±19-21 (Die Abhebung de Analyse der Weltlichkeit gegen die Interpretation der Welt bei Descartes)

C.S.Lewis, Studies in words, Cambridge, Cambridge university press, 1960,1967, « world », pp.214-269

Françoise Joukovsky, Le regard intérieur, Paris, Nizet, 1982, « l¡¦âme et le cosmos », pp.107-144

Jean-François Mattéi, l¡¦ordre du monde, Paris, PUF, 1989 : « cosmos », pp.27-31

Jean-Luc Nancy, Etre singulier pluriel, Paris, Galilée, 1996, « la création du monde », pp.34-40

Jean Pépin, Théologie cosmique et théologie chrétienne, Paris, PUF, 1964

François Rouger, Existence-Monde-Origine, Paris, L¡¦Harmattan, 1996, « Monde et Phusis », pp.197-236

J-L Vielillard-Baron, Platon e l¡¦idéalisme allemand, Paris, Beauchesne, 1979, « le cosmos et son âme », pp.147-201

--, Platonisme et interprétation, Paris, Vrin, 1988, « l¡¦âme du monde », pp.221-240

Jean Wahl, Traité de métaphysique, Paris, Payot, 1953, « le monde », pp.656-660

A.N.Whitehead, Process and Reality, New York, The Free Press (Macmillan Publishing), 1978

Collective : « Monde(s) », Alter, Revue de Phénoménologie, N¢X6, 1998, Fontenay-aux-Roses, Alter

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[1] F. W. J. Schelling, Sämmtliche Werke, Stuttgart, Cotta, 1861, Abteilung 1, Band 9, S.3.

[2] ¡§The sum-total of all appearances (the world) is the object of Cosmology¡¨: Kant, Critique of pure reason, B391/A334, tr. Smith, p.323.

[3] For example, E. Housset, Husserl et l¡¦énigme du monde, Paris, Seuil, 2000.

[4] Husserl, Erfahung und Urteil, Hamburg, Glassen & Goverts, 1954, S.30 (we cite the french tralation, Expérience et jugement, tr. D. Souche, Paris, PUF, 1970, p.40 ).

[5] E. Fink, Welt und Endlichkeit, Hrsg. Franz-A. Schwarz, Wüzburg, Königshausen & Neumann, 1990, chap. 2, S. 16; we cite the French version ¡§ Monde et Finitude ¡¨, in : ALTER, N¢X6, 1998, p.365. The English translation is due to my own responsibility.

[6] Our translation of the text : ¡§ Mais peut-être n¡¦est-ce pas selon la bifurcation de la Nature et de l¡¦esprit que nous avons à penser le monde et nous-mêmes ¡¨ (Le Philosophe et son ombre, in : Signe, Paris, Gallimard, 1960, p.205).

[7] The observation is of Jacques Garelli, Expérience du monde et réflexion dans la Sixième Méditation Cartésienne de Eugen Fink, in : ALTER, N¢X6, 1998, p.185.

[8] ¡§ C¡¦est seulement sur la base de l¡¦être au monde que l¡¦homme peut être dit exister. (¡K) En un mot, il n¡¦y a de réalisation humaine de présence (Dasein) que sous la forme de l¡¦être-au-monde (In-der-Welt-sein). (¡K) Non moins irrévocablement que le matérialisme, bien que dans un cadre essentiellement différent puisqu¡¦il s¡¦agit ici d¡¦une détermination phénoménologique et non d¡¦une hypothèse méaphysique, l¡¦analytique heideggérienne liquide tout ce qui peut bien faire de l¡¦homme un "halluciné de l¡¦arrière-monde" ¡¨, in : Jean Beaufret, De l¡¦existentialisme à Heidegger, Paris, Vrin, 1986, p.20.

[9] Fink, op. cit. S.16 (ALTER, N¢X6, 1998, p.366).

[10] ¡§ Je n¡¦entends pas par là ce qu¡¦Aristote lui-même comprenait sous les termes kosmos et ouranos, à savoir la totalité ordonnée de la réalité formant l¡¦univers, mais bien le concept phénoménologique de ¡¥monde¡¦, qui désigne ce dans quoi nous sommes¡Xde telle sorte qu¡¦il constitue l¡¦un des éléments d¡¦une structure dont la compréhension implique en même temps celle du ¡¥nous¡¦ et celle du ¡¥sommes¡¦. ¡¨ in : R. Brague, Aristote et la question du monde. Essai sur le contexte cosmologique et anthropologique de l¡¦ontologie, Paris, PUF, 1988, pp.5-6.

[11] Rémi Brague, La sagesse du monde. Histoire de l¡¦expérience humaine de l¡¦univers, Paris, Fayard, 1999, pp.41-86.

[12] R. Brague, op. cit. pp.249-261.